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P m f w Khmisar, wide& knownfor his pioneering teaching
materials on c r i m i d p c e d u n and his many articles dejiending
and explaining the Warren Court's "revolution"in American
m*rninalp'ocedure,is a specialist in constsnststutional
h.
He has
studied the impact and a-th
of the US.Supreme Court
decision that produced what we now d l the Miranda Rule since
the decision was handed down in Miranda v. h n a in 1966.
H m he i d e n t i i three distinct threats to the protections the
d i n g m d d f o r suspects and dejietzdants.
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Miranda v. Arizona (1966) was the centerpiece of
the Warren Court's "revolution" in American criminal
procedure. Moreover, as Professor Stephen Schulhofer
of the University of Chicago Law School has recently
noted, a numbir of the Miranda safeguards "have
now become entrenched in the interrogation
procedures of many countries around the world."
(See generally Craig Bradley, "The Emerging
International Consensus as to Criminal Procedure
Rules," 14 Michigan Journal of International Law 171
[1993].)
But Miranda is in serious trouble at home.
A provision of the federal criminal code enacted in
1968, 18 U.S.C. § 3501, purports to "repeal" Miranda
and reinstate the pre-Miranda standard for the
admissibility of confessions -the due process"totality of circumstances"-"voluntariness" test.
Section 3501 has been avoided by every
administration since its enactment more than 30
years ago. But this has not discouraged conservative
legal foundations from urging the federal courts to
inject § 3501 into their cases.
In 1999, these legal groups gained a stunning
victory when a 2-1 majority of a panel of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled against the express wishes of the Department of
Justice -that the pre-Miranda voluntariness test set
forth in § 3501, rather than the famous Miranda
case, governs the admissibility of confessions in the
federal courts. According to the Fourth Circuit panel,
the Miranda rules are not constitutionally required;
they are only "prophylactic" rules designed to
implement or reinforce the underlying constitutional
right. Therefore, § 3501 is a valid exercise of
congressional authority to override judicially created
rules [that are] not part of the U.S. Constitution.
I strongly disagree. I share the view of a number
of criminal procedure and constitutional law
professors that the Miranda rules were an
understandable (and long overdue) response to the
inadequacies of the mushy, subjective, and unruly
voluntariness test (under which every factor was
relevant, but virtually nothing was decisive). I agree,
too, that prophylactic rules are a necessary and
proper feature of constitutional law - a means of
interpreting constitutional provisions in light of
institutional realities - a means of providing
constitutional rights much-needed "breathing space."
But if the present Court were to address this issue in
the near future, I am afraid that at least four justices
might uphold the statute purporting to abolish
Miranda (the Chief Justice and Justices OIConnor,
Scalia, and Thomas).

Section 3501 is not the only danger facing
Miranda. A decade and a half ago, in Oregon v. Elstad
(1985), a case that upheld the admissibility of a
second confession made at the time the police
complied with Miranda, although earlier that day the
police had obtained a statement from the same
defendant - in violation of Miranda - the Supreme
Court indicated that the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine did not apply to Miranda at all. If so, all the
"fruits" of (or evidence derived from) a Miranda
violation would be admissible - not just a second
confession or a witness for the prosecution whose
identity the government learned from the
inadmissible confession, but physical evidence, e.g.,
the drugs, the proceeds from a bank robbery, or the
marder weapon.
The Court has never explicitly decided whether
physical or nontestimonial evidence derived from a
Miranda violation is admissible. However, I have to
say there is a good chance it will do so. In the
meantime, the state courts and the lower federal
courts have almost uniformly ruled that the
prosecution may use the nontestimonial fruits of a
Miranda violation.
Some 30 years ago, Judge Henry Friendly noted
that "'what data there are' suggest that the obtaining
of leads with which to obtain real or demonstrative
evidence or prosecution witnesses is more important
than getting statements for use in court." (Emphasis
added.) Therefore, a ruling that all types of evidence
derived from a Miranda violation are admissible
would strike the landmark case a grievous blow. How
could we possibly expect the police to comply with
Miranda if the courts barred onlythe use of
incriminating statements obtained in violation of that
doctrine, but none of the leads or clues or evidence
these statements brought to life?
Miranda faces still another danger -there is
good reason to think that in a substantial number of
police stations throughout the land police
interrogators are violating Miranda in a fundamental
way. They are getting suspects to waive their rights
- by persuading them it's in their "best interest" to
tell the police "their side of the story" so the police
can help them - before they advise them of their
rights.

These interrogation techniques were first
described at length in David Simon's book, Homicide:
A Year on the Killing Streets. The author, a Baltimore
Sun reporter, was granted unlimited access to the
city's homicide unit for a full year. Recent articles
indicate that the interrogation tactics employed by
the Baltimore police are being utilized by detectives in
a number of other police departments as well.
If the admissibility of a statement obtained as a
result of these methods were challenged by a defense
lawyer, a prosecutor would be in a strong position, for
she would be armed with a signed waiver of rights
form (and a signed explanation of rights form as
well). But she would be in a strong position only if as would hardly be surprising -the detective
involved in the case conveniently failed to remember
how the suspect was induced to sign the waiver of
rights form. However, if all the details were known if the entire transaction had been tape recorded no court would be able to admit the statement unless
it was prepared to overrule Miranda itself.
(Unfortunately neither the Warren Court nor any
other Supreme Court has ever required law
enforcement officers to tape record, when feasible.
how the warnings of rights are delivered, how the
waiver takes place, and what the police do thereafter.
And the overwhelming majority of state courts have
held that the testimony of a police officer that he
gave complete Miranda warnings and obtained a
voluntary and intelligent waiver of rights need not be
corroborated.)
Miranda emphasizes that "any evidence" that a
custodial suspect was "threatened, tricked, or cajoled
into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant
did not voluntarily waive his privilege." But in a
substantial number of station houses, the police are
threatening the suspect: they are telling him that
unless he talks to them about the homicide, they will
write it up as first degree murder and turn him over to
a merciless assistant prosecutor. The police are also
tricking the suspect: they are leading him to believe
that it is in his best interest to tell them his side of the
story. Indeed, the police are pretending that talking to
the police instead of asking for a lawyer is the
suspect's only chance to get the homicide charge
reduced (or perhaps even dismissed).
The police are not supposed to subject a custodial
suspect to questioning unless and until they obtain a
waiver of his rights. Unfortunately, what they are
really doing in too many places is subjecting
individuals tc "interrogation" before they waive their
rights - indeed, before they even advise them of
their rights.
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Once the police have taken a suspect into custody.
there is no such thing (at least there is no lawful basis
for any such thing) as a "preinterview" or "prewaiver" interrogation. The waiver of rights transaction
is supposed to take place as soon as the curtain goes
up - not be postponed until the second act.
Reports about how modern police interrogators
have "adapted" to Miranda underscore the need to
record on video- or audiotape the entire proceeding in
the police station - any preliminary conversation,
the reading of rights, the waiver transactions, and
any subsequent interrogation. There is nothing new or
startling a bout tape recording police questioning.
Virtually all of the nation's criminal procedure
professors - critics and defenders of Miranda alike
-favor the idea. Moreover, there is widespread
satisfaction with a mandatory recording requirement
in Great Britain. Why then is tape recording, where
feasible, not the general practice in American police
stations today?
The only startling thing about this issue is that,
after all these years, American law enforcement
officials are still able to prevent objective recordation
of all the facts of police "interviews" or "conversations"
with a suspect and, of course, how the warnings are
delivered and how the waiver of rights is obtained.
But if you were a member of the Baltimore homicide
unit (or a member of other police departments
employing the same interrogation methods), would
you favor tape recording (and making available for
public inspection) what really happens in the
interrogation room?

